In interpersonal value conflicts ethical principles are employed to justify own actions. 
Personal Values
Values were posited by Rokeach (1973) as the primary content of an individual's identity. According to Rokeach, values function as cognitive standards for individual actions. He contends that values are universal but are differentially esteemed. In addressing the structure of values, Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) (Schwartz, 1992 (Schwartz, , 2011 . The upper part of the value circle expresses self-transcendence and is made up of universalistic values and benevolence, followed clockwise by tradition, conformity and security values (conservation), power and achievement (self-enhancement), hedonistic values, stimulation and selfdirection (openness to change). To assess the value preferences of individuals participating in this study, we used a short questionnaire with 14 bipolar rating items (Strack, 2004) , utilizing the empirical content structure of the Schwartz value circle (see Figure 1 and Appendix 2).
Situational Values
Just as individuals vary in personality traits, motives or value preferences, real situations differ in certain (mostly unknown) dimensions and can be categorized into various classes. Gollan and Witte (2008) relate value laden situations to Heider's concept of situational ought (1958) . We further assume that the content structure of values that Schwartz (1992) found in the variance between individuals can also be applied to the variance between situations. For example, the experiments in early social psychology can be interpreted as powerful demonstrations of value-laden situations: Conformity presses (Asch, 1955) and compliance demands (Milgram, 1963) lead to actions of conformity and obedience. Conformity and obedience may be seen as values within the experimental situations. In some later studies, participants were asked directly to express which values might be appropriate in different situations (Feather, 1990; Heath, 1976) . As Feather (1990) shows, strong situations may override the effects of individual value differences. Action in accordance with situational values, activated by vignettes, usually induce less regret than a mismatch of personal and situation values (second study in Lönnqvist et al., 2006) . However, as situational values and the approach of interactionism have been given little attention in psychological value research, we will state our hypotheses on personal values
and situational values separately.
Ethical principles
As Maio and Olson (1998) show, lay people normally do not reflect on their values and value-based decision-making in everyday life. However, when people are aware of conflicting values and when argumentative support is demanded by the situation, they are able to justify their position and to relate their values to moral reasons (i.e., Maio & Olson, 1998; Tetlock, 1986) . Moral philosophy, on the other hand, elaborates possible justifications for such value-laden actions. Philosophers claim to have identified all conceivable moral reasons on the level of ethical principles (Larmore, 1987) . Therefore, while we expect that people's own moral reasons may be less clearly elaborated, these reasons can nevertheless be fully described by the prototypes of ethical principles clarified in moral philosophy.
Within social psychology, attempts have been made to operationalize these principles. Best known is Forsyth's (1980) taxonomy of ethical principles. Combining high or low relativism with high or low idealism, he postulated four types of ideologies: situationism, absolutism, subjectivism and exceptionism. He validated his Ethics Position
Questionnaire with individual differences from the domain of moral judgments and attitudes (Forsyth & Nye, 1990; Hadjistavropoulos et al., 2003) ; for example, Machiavellian subjects are more relativistic and less idealistic whereas subjects endorsing an ethic of caring are highly idealistic and non-relativistic (Forsyth et al., 1988) . It is, however, not easy to relate the resulting categories to the ethical principles elaborated in moral philosophy (Strack & Gennerich, 2007) . More in line with moral philosophy, Witte and Doll (1995; Gollan & Witte, 2008) proposed taxonomy of four principles: utilitarianism, deontology, intuitionism and hedonism. The results of their study
show that ethical positions depend on the situation (they used vignettes of positive/negative and individual, interpersonal, and social impact situations). Although they did not explore values, they additionally found differences between East-and West-German participants. Their study encourages research on the influence of personal and situational determinants of ethical principles (see the review in Gollan & Witte, 2008) . Based on this research, we distinguish the following five principles:
Utilitarianism we define with Larmore (1987) based on the principle of consequentialism; i.e., a person must choose that action which leads to the optimum positive outcome for all concerned. Because this principle aims at the optimum for all, it clearly favors self-transcendent values. On the other hand and with reference to the value dimension of openness to change vs. conservation, it can lead to actions in conflict with tradition, because the criterion of utility is basically ahistorical.
Deontology subscribes to the classical Kantian categorical imperative: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should be a universal law" (Beck, 1989) . It should be emphasized that deontology primarily demands that certain actions never be taken, regardless of the consequences (Larmore, 1987) . Therefore deontology might favor conservative actions, as the range of justifiable actions is limited in comparison to the utilitarian principle. Fraedrich and colleagues (Cherry & Fraedrich, 2002; Fraedrich & Ferrel, 1992) provide some empirical evidence that deontologists are less influenced by negative consequences for themselves in comparison to egoists and utilitarianists, and deontological reasons are preferred under higher risk. As the perception of risks is related to values of conservation (Jost et al., 2003) , we predict deontology to be related to values of tradition and security.
In earlier research, partiality was discussed in practical ethical reasoning but was not yet recognized as a distinct basic principle. It was first introduced as such in moral philosophy by Larmore (1987) . He defined partiality as being grounded in particular-istic duties evoked by personal promises and bonds. In everyday life, such bonds are primarily based in family relationships where universalism is restricted. Therefore, the principle of partiality should relate to values of security between the poles of conservation and self-enhancement.
Hedonism as an ethical principle was defined by Witte and Doll (1995) as being focused on personal consequences; thus, social norms should not be in conflict with the welfare of the individual (Parfit, 1984) . This ethical orientation toward the self was first and less moderately elaborated by Stirner (1995) , who based his theory on egoism stating that other people are the objects of personal consummation. "Because this is best for me" is an example of a hedonistic justification. Because of the founding principle of egoism, this ethical principle relates to self-enhancement values.
Intuitionism was defined by Witte and Doll (1995) as the limitation of duty by emotional experience, as exemplified in their intuitionism sample statement, "I simply have to act in this way!" Intuitionism is thus based on a person's subjective sense of morality and represents their inner direction, which Riesman (1950) relates to liberalism. Therefore, this principle should be primarily related to self direction values. Therefore, we expect personal values and situational values to be specifically related to ethical principles. As stated in hypotheses 1 and 2, we expect personal values and situational values pointing to the same content to be functionally equivalent (i.e. work in the same direction). The principle of functional equivalence was initially proposed by G. W. Allport (1959) to explain traits as the bases for actions and as the principles for perceiving different situations as equivalent opportunities to express the traits. The functional equivalence of personal and situational factors was elaborated by Schmitt and colleagues (Schmitt et al., 2003; Schmitt & Sabbagh, 2004) principles to justify his or her actions given in the vignette. Seven vignettes with systematic value content were varied within each subject.
Participants
Our intent was to recruit a heterogeneous non-academic sample to maximize variance in personal values and life experiences (ordinary people, so to speak). Therefore, we asked students and acquaintances to distribute the questionnaires to people not related to the university. 132 individuals living in Germany participated in the study. The return rate of the distributed questionnaires was 66%. The age of participants varied from 16 to 77 years (M = 41, SD = 17); 60% were female and 40% male; 58% lived in the western part of Germany, and 42% in the eastern part. Twelve percent of participants had a relatively low level of education (9 years), 47% a moderate level (10 years), and 38% a higher level of education (12-13 years).
Materials
Value-laden situations. Seven vignettes (see appendix) were experimentally con- Ethical principles. Each of the five ethical principles (deontology, utilitarianism, partiality, hedonism, and intuitionism) was assessed using two statements (see appendix 1). The ten statements were formulated according to the theoretical definitions given above. Each statement was rated for agreement on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (rather no, rather would not use) to 5 (rather yes, rather would use). To control the sequence effect of the ten statements, four random sequences were produced and varied between subjects. The mean of the single items range from M = 2.90 to 3.57 with SD from 1.00 to 1.11. In the raw data, the two-item scales show moderate reliabilities acceptable for the purpose of this study (Cronbach's Alpha: deontology α = .67, utilitarism α = .71, partiality α = .60, hedonism α = .53 and intuitionism α = .67). Therefore the two statements were averaged for each principle.
Personal values. The personal value preferences of the participants were assessed by the 14BiPole-Value questionnaire (Strack, 2004;  
Results
To test the validity of the three hypotheses, we analyzed the variance of the agreement scores. In the experimental 7 × 5 within subject design (seven situations, five ethical principles), the participants' scores on the two dimensions of the value circle (the personal values) were included as covariates. The covariates were allowed to interact with the experimental factors. Each agreement score is therefore expressed by a linear equation with 12 sources of variance (see Table 1 ).
The constant source (source 1 in The main effect of the ethical principles (source 7 in Table 1 ). nevolence or traditional values evoked deontological reasoning. The situational approach renders a clearer result regarding the principle of partiality, which was enhanced by security situations. Intuitionalism was used for self-directed actions and hedonistic reasoning was applied in self-enhancement situations.
As the three-way interactions of personal values with the situational values' dependence on ethical principles remain insignificant (source 11 and 12 in Table 1 : F < 1, p > .70), the hypothesized synergetic interaction of person and situation was not found in this study. Person and situation effects remain merely additive.
Discussion
This investigation addressed relations between personal values, situational values and ethical reasoning. We applied Schwartz's value circle (1992) and analyzed the dependencies of preferences for five ethical principles on personal value preferences and on value-laden situations given in experimentally specified vignettes. Personal diversity in values was fully combined with experimentally controlled situational values. The within-subject design ensured that an analysis of variance could regress agreement with ethical principles to the value content of situations, the value preference of respondents, and the interaction of both.
The correlations illustrated in Figure 3 and 4 indicate that ethical principles are substantially determined by both a person's value orientation and the value content of the situation. The results remain additive, no person x situation interaction emerges.
By and large, the first two hypotheses were confirmed. Persons striving towards security and tradition preferred the principle of deontology and partiality. Persons with value orientations of self-transcendence and openness to change preferred the principle of utilitarianism and intuitionism. Persons with hedonistic values preferred hedonistic principles. Thus, the examination of personal value systems illustrates the classical conflict between the utilitarian and deontological traditions (cf. Weber, 1958) . Substantial effects of the vignette contents support the second hypothesis. (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003) .
The limitations of our experimentally-designed questionnaire study must also be considered. For a questionnaire study, the participant sample size is rather small and enables the discussion of medium effect sizes. However, for an experimental approach and the effect sizes found in our data, the sample-size is quite appropriate. Additionally, the generated heterogeneity of the sample assured the variance in the personal values (see e.g., Schwartz & Rubel, 2005 , in our data self-transcendence could be regressed on age, female sex, and education; traditional values on age and unemployment. The personal values essentially mediated demographic effects on the ethical principles (Figure 3) . The East-West residences of the subjects remain without effects.
Furthermore, the merely modest reliability of the ethical principles' measures is suboptimal; therefore, the stability of the length of the vectors in Figures 3 and 4 is unclear. They might become more reliable if more than two items were employed to asses each ethical principle (e.g., Witte & Doll, 1995 , used five items per scale).
Therefore, we primarily interpret the direction of the vectors. Additionally, the sampling of the situations should be discussed. Limitations emerged in respect to the situational effects in Figure 4 . Because only seven situations were presented, the correlation results in Figure 4 are less reliable than the effects of personal values in Figure   3 . To obtain the same reliability of personal and situational sources, the samples of persons and situations would need to be of equal size. In laboratory studies, even smaller numbers of situations are usually varied (e.g., Schmitt et al. 2003 Schmitt et al. , 2004 Lönnqvist et al., 2006, varied four) . Although limited, the number of seven situations seems justifiable by the motivational limitations of the participants under demand. To ensure a sample of situations representative at least in content, we constructed the situation vignettes according the Schwartz value circle. We assume that the value circle provides a complete representation of situations in the way that it represents all possible content classes of personal value orientations. For the sake of commensurability, we worded the situational vignettes as closely as possible to the values given in Schwartz (1992) . By this means, we assured that the vignettes activated values varying systematically across all regions of the value circle.
Hence, the abstractness of the situations corresponds to the abstractness of personal values. The lack of feature concreteness of the vignette situations can be seen as a typical limitation of a vignette study. Their abstractedness was a foreseeable consequence of the value's operationalization, and it demands an imaginative role making on the side of the participants. Figure 2 controlled that the vignettes sufficiently express situational values. The overall results provide evidence that the participants were able to make sense of the abstract situations provided.
The fact that the content of the situations represents the whole value circle additionally enables us to identify the acquiescence usually shown by subjects preferring conservation and self-transcendence (benevolence and tradition values). The general linear model (GLM) is a suitable method for separating the sources of variance in the approach of interactionism. If the number of situations will be increased, hierarchical linear modeling might be statistically more adequate (Raudenbush et al., 2002 ).
When we relate the results to the discussion of moral principles within moral philosophy, we see that the results support the notion of inherent conflict in the ethical universe. In the second half of the twentieth century, various authors abandoned attempts to construct a unifying system which would integrate different ethical positions (Hampshire, 1983; Larmore, 1987; Nagel, 1979; Weber, 1958) . This was deemed an irresolvable conflict between the utilitarian and the deontological traditions (e.g., Weber, 1958) . This challenges universality in basic principles of ethical thinking and could undermine the if-then structure of general ethical decisions. In line with the theoretical analyses of ethical principles, the results suggest that the principles are perceived divergently, following the plurality already accepted for values (Schwartz, 1992 ).
However, plurality as an irresolvable coexistence of incompatible perspectives seems to incrementally receive acceptance only in the case of social or interpersonal diversity. The study therefore was restricted to the social situation of justifications in interpersonal value conflicts. Future analysis might examine intrapersonal value conflicts, its intrapersonal reasoning (Bernard et al., 2003a) , and accompanied affects. In this line a bit of incertitude affect came to the fore when our subjects less agreed with all ethic principles applied to specific situations, respectively their imag- 
